





Abstract—This paper describes pattern-related aspects of the 
prototype Protection and Assessment Workbench developed as 
part of the MASTER EU 7th Framework collaborative research 
project. The Workbench supports a model-driven design process 
within the overall MASTER methodology. It includes a 
Protection and Regulatory Model (PRM) tool that is a step 
towards turning the Workbench into an ‘organisational memory’ 
for design practices that accumulates and improves over time. 
PRMs are essentially control process design patterns that 
incorporate proven strategies in a re-usable form, saving time 
and improving quality and consistency. 
 




HIS paper will describe pattern-related aspects of the 
prototype Protection and Assessment (P&A) Workbench 
developed as part of the MASTER EU 7th Framework 
collaborative research project [1]. MASTER ran from 2008-
2011 with the aim of providing a methodology and 
infrastructure that facilitate monitoring, enforcement, and 
auditing of security compliance, especially where highly 
dynamic service oriented architectures are used to support 
business process enactment in single, multi-domain, and 
iterated contexts. 
The P&A Workbench is a prototype graphical software tool 
that supports a model-driven design process within the overall 
MASTER methodology. The term ‘Protection & Assessment’ 
reflects the focus of MASTER on design and execution of 
processes that enforce security policies and measure their 
effectiveness. The P&A Workbench is intended for use by an 
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analyst/designer working in conjunction with a variety of 
business stakeholders to develop a Design Model. Typically, a 
Design Model is constructed, evaluated and elaborated 
iteratively until stakeholders agree that it describes an 
effective and affordable P&A solution that complies with 
control objectives. It is then refined further until the 
description is sufficiently concrete to provide the basis for 
implementation of a P&A system based on the MASTER 
infrastructure. Verification and Simulation tools are used to 
help confirm that the implemented system will indeed be fully 
compliant with the control objectives. The main output 
derived from the Design Model is a Policy Document that 
specifies rules that are interpreted by the run-time P&A 
system and determine its behaviour.  
The Workbench comprises an extensible set of graphical 
modelling and transformation tools within a loosely coupled 
architectural framework, and a Repository in which interim 
and final models and other documents are stored. Collections 
of documents related to the same project are checked out of 
the Repository into a local workspace while being worked on 
using the Workbench tools. Documents in the Repository, 
notably Policy Documents, may be made available for 
deployment to, or consultation by, the MASTER infrastructure 
components at run-time. Not strictly part of the Workbench, 
but closely related to it, are the MASTER Verification and 
Simulation tools. These are invoked from the workbench in 
order to test certain properties of the Design Model.  
The Workbench achieved its objectives as a pre-competitive 
research prototype. It is a significant step towards the vision of 
a software tool to support a model-driven approach to the 
design and implementation of security controls and indicators 
derived from compliance requirements. The core functionality 
has been implemented, proving the concept and providing a 
basis for future development as a production tool. It is also 
suitable for trials and pilot projects for organisations 
considering adopting the MASTER approach. A production 
version would need to form part of an integrated suite or else 
inter-operate with leading modelling, development and 
management tools either as part of or mixed and matched on a 
best-of-breed basis. The prototype also provides an excellent 
platform for continued experimental implementation of 
advanced features, e.g. concerning knowledge management 
and re-use. Furthermore, the experience of developing the 
workbench has been useful in evaluating and building 
expertise in model-driven design via domain-specific 
languages (DSLs), and more specifically in use of the DSL-
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building tools from the Eclipse Modelling Project.  
II. USAGE SCENARIO 
A typical usage scenario for the workbench is as follows. A 
company already has a service-oriented infrastructure that it 
uses to partially automate the enactment of certain key 
business processes. It has identified that some high level 
security policies are relevant for the enactment of these 
business processes and the resources used. We are not 
concerned at this point whether the policies are due to 
regulatory requirements, industry codes of practice, or are of 
company-internal origin. The company now wishes to deploy 
IT controls to ensure as far as is practical that the policies are 
complied with and that the extent of any non-compliance is 
measured.  
The company has decided to use the MASTER 
infrastructure to implement the controls. Company IT and 
security staff are now faced with a range of design decisions 
regarding how to use the ‘vanilla’ MASTER software to create 
an appropriate set of controls and indicators that interacts 
correctly with the existing infrastructure. The main means of 
customising the MASTER run-time infrastructure to 
implement the controls is to deploy a set of Signalling, 
Monitoring, Enforcement and Assessment policies to it. 
Major requirements on the workbench are: 
• to support the application of MASTER Methodology 
steps that guide the analyst and business stakeholders 
through description of the business context, selection 
and refinement of Control Objectives (COs) and 
Control Activities (CAs), specification of Key 
Assurance and Key Security Indicators (KAIs and 
KSIs), and definition of Control Processes (CPs) that 
implement the CAs. 
• to use the Verification and Simulation (V&S) tools to 
help confirm the correctness of the CPs, i.e. that 
composing the CPs with the relevant target business 
process will result in compliance with the COs. 
• to facilitate implementation of these design decisions 
by automating the creation of MASTER Signalling, 
Monitoring, Enforcement and Assessment policies. 
Furthermore, the company wants compliance to be 
auditable to provide its management, shareholders, customers, 
partners, and legal and regulatory authorities with confidence 
that the policies are indeed being followed. This means it must 
be easy to check that appropriate controls are deployed and 
that they have been implemented correctly. Here, ‘appropriate’ 
means that the controls are suitable to achieve the intention of 
the policies taking into account the anticipated threat 
environment and the risk appetite and budget of the 
organisation. The workbench therefore needs, in addition, to 
enable an independent auditor to review and verify design and 
deployment decisions to ensure that appropriate choices have 
been made to implement the high level policies  
The company will need to update the controls as 
requirements and business, technology and threat 
environments change. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the 
company will implement controls for a single process in 
isolation (except as a pilot), but rather would roll MASTER 
out for all relevant business processes as part of a major 
compliance or Business Process Re-engineering initiative. The 
Workbench therefore needs to support the maintenance of 
controls over time and ideally, re-use of successful controls 
and accumulation of experience. 
 
III. SECURITY PATTERNS 
Schumacher et al. [2], inspired by the approach to patter-
oriented software architecture taken in [3] give the following 
definition: “A security pattern describes a particular recurring 
security problem that arises in specific contexts, and presents a 
well-proven generic solution for it. The solution consists of a 
set of interacting roles that can be arranged into multiple 
concrete design structures, as well as a process to create one 
particular structure.” Security problems typically deal with 
constraining the behaviour of systems to uphold 
confidentiality and integrity properties while continuing to 
provide a service to legitimate users, in the face of malicious 
or misguided agents. A security pattern establishes an 
approach to solving a class of security problems by 
generalising over related successful cases. 
Schumacher at al. regard humans as being the only audience 
for patterns. They further say that it is not practical to make 
patterns machine-readable and automatable, as it is all but 
impossible to formalise them. They contrast patterns with 
“other design or modelling techniques such as the Unified 
Modelling Language” that result in artefacts that are intended 
to be readable by machines and humans. This view is not 
universal, however; for. For example, Sowa identifies three 
kinds of pattern (syntax, semantics and pragmatics) and three 
kinds of notation (natural language, linear notations for logic 
and computation, and graphical diagrams and movies) in his 
work applying conceptual graphs to knowledge design 
patterns [4]. 
The approach taken in MASTER attempts to bridge the two 
worlds of patterns and modelling languages. A MASTER 
pattern (termed a Protection & Regulatory Model, PRM) 
includes fields for textual / free form entries that are aimed 
purely at a human audience and are broadly similar to those 
found in ‘classical’ patterns. However, it also contains 
corresponding design fragments expressed in the MASTER 
modelling language.  
The intention is that the Workbench will incorporate a 
library of PRMs. In the course of developing a design model, 
the analyst and stakeholders will browse this library looking 
for PRMs that are relevant to the application context and the 
aspect of the model being worked on. For example, the analyst 
may be working on a control objective aimed at minimising 
opportunities for insider fraud and find a pattern describing 
how to do this using the principle of separation of duties. This 
stage is similar to searching a conventional pattern system.  
The analyst then turns to the model fragments described in 
the PRM. These are templates with place-holders that must 





is instantiated and added to model, and the analyst stitches it 
into place by associating existing entities with placeholders. 
Often, the existing model will need to be re-worked to enable 
a good fit, for example, a role in a business process might 
have to be divided into two simpler roles to allow separation 
of duties. Sometimes, the changes required to achieve a fit 
may be judged excessive, and the pattern will be discarded and 
a new one sought. Not all the place-holders need to match 
existing model elements; indeed some may give rise to further 
searches of the pattern library.  
Use of patterns in this way results in improved quality (as a 
results of adopting proven solutions and best-practice) and 
also in increased productivity as models are constructed partly 
from pre-fabricated components rather than always working at 
the level of the primitives of the modelling language. 
Once a project is completed, the model is reviewed with the 
aim of identifying successful strategies with potential for re-
use. These are recast in more abstract form, documented as 
PRMs and deposited in the library. PRMs that have been used 
should also be critiqued as part of this review and comments 
added to the record in the library. If appropriate, a PRM may 
be modified or elaborated in the light of experience, or even 
deleted if it has proved unsuccessful on several occasions. In 
this way, the Workbench will become an ‘organisational 
memory’ for design practices that accumulates and improves 
over time. 
PRMs are now covered in more detail, before moving on to 
describe an early prototype PRM tool that was implemented as 
part of Workbench during the MASTER project. 
IV. PROTECTION AND REGULATORY MODELS 
Each PRM describes a design pattern that captures “best 
practice” in designing control processes for a specific control 
objective in a specific context. The essence of a PRM is a set 
of parameterised fragments of control processes, and each 
PRM is linked to a generalised control objective. The control 
process fragments in each PRM are composed and sequenced 
in a specific manner. Each control process fragment is defined 
by a set of allowed event traces. An event trace is a sequence 
of observable events. These event traces may consume events 
from or add events to its enclosing environment. Some of the 
events in the traces may be bound to terms in the PRM’s 
control objective or the events that are consumed or added to 
its enclosing environment. These events are defined as 
exposed PRM events and are included in the parameters of the 
PRM. Non-exposed events, internal PRM events, are not 
visible to the actors who interact with the PRM. Internal PRM 
events can be renamed without any impact on actors and 
processes that interact with the PRM. Exposed PRM events 
are typically the input and output events of the PRM, but may 
also include intermediate events. 
E ach PRM contains the following elements. 
1) A textual description that describes the purposes of the 
PRM, its associated control objective(s) and the type of 
environments in which the PRM is envisaged to be 
deployed. This description should be brief enough to 
allow a user to browse this description within a collection 
of PRMs, yet it should contain sufficient information to 
allow a user to make a preliminary decision on whether a 
PRM is appropriate for a particular design. 
2) A description of the parameters of the PRM. 
3) A description of the context in which the problem that is 
being solved arises. In addition to describing the attacks 
that the PRM is addressing, the section also describes the 
organisational context in which the PRM can be used. 
More specifically the PRM describes the requirements 
and restrictions on the organisational structure in which 
the PRM can be used in terms of: 
a) The entities participating in the solution: Actor roles, 
Goals, Activities, and Resources. 
b) The structural dependencies among entities. These 
structural dependencies can arise due to the context of 
the problem the PRM is addressing or due to the 
structure of an organisation. An organisation can 
impose dependencies on entities and actors. For 
example, the organisation may require certain entities 
collaborate together. It may define which actors are 
subordinate to other actors, and which actors have 
incompatible roles and hence require a separation of 
their duties. 
4) A description of any infrastructural services required by 
the PRM. For example, an authentication PRM may 
require a service that associates a set of roles with each 
user. 
5) A description of the control objective implemented by the 
PRM. This is given by a textual description and a formal 
statement of the control objective using the MASTER 
Property Specification Language. 
6) A formal description of the control process fragments that 
implement the PRM. This description is specified in the 
M-calculus, which has both a graphical and textual 
representation. The M-calculus is a process calculus that 
extends Milner’s π-calculus [5] to include timed events 
and probabilistic events. The motivation for describing 
the control process fragments formally is that this enables 
the PRM designer to prove that the PRM implements its 
control objective in the specified contexts. 
7) A description of the possible impact of the PRM on the 
overall system. This section should address, but not be 
limited to, issues such as availability, confidentiality, 
integrity, performance and usability. 
When composing multiple PRMs, care needs to be taken 
that the names of the exposed PRM events do not conflict. 
Internal PRM events can be renamed to avoid any conflict 
with events in the target processes, control processes or other 
PRMs. Since the exposed PRM events are all parameters of 
the PRM, each PRM is instantiated with events from the target 
and control processes. If two PRMs reference the same event 
from the target and/or control processes, this event is called a 
conflicted event. Conflicted events may require special 
handling, such as duplication to ensure that each PRM can 
consume the event, or amalgamation to ensure that conflicted 
events produced by both PRMs do not invalidate the system’s 





Since PRMs represent “best practice” they have an added 
significance in environment with multiple trust domains. 
While organisation X may be reluctant to disclose the details 
of the control processes it is providing to organisation Y, if 
organisation X agrees to provide a specific authentication 
PRM then organisation Y can be sure of that the corresponding 
control objective is achieved (subject to the PRM's 
assumptions on its environment) without organisation Y 
revealing, or allowing access, to the control infrastructure 
within organisation Y. 
The use of PRMs can be illustrated by looking at how one 
could be used to represent a control taken from ISO 17779-
2005. The ISO standard describes Control 11.1.1 “Access 
Control Policy” as “An access control policy should be 
established, documented and reviewed based on the business 
and security requirement for access”. The text does not 
describe how to implement Control 11.1.1, but it does describe 
some properties that any implementation of the control 11.1.1 
must have. The corresponding PRM would capture a “best 
practice” implementation of this control in specific contexts 
and outline how the properties specified for this control can be 
proved in these contexts. The main objective of PRM is to 
capture precisely and formalise the knowledge required to 
implement a control process aiming to be compliant with 
control objective derived from a business objective or 
regulation. The control objectives describe “patterns” that 
compliant control processes must match and PRMs formalise 
these patterns.  
V. PRM TOOL 
The prototype PRM tool is an Eclipse plugin that is a step 
towards turning the Workbench into an ‘organisational 
memory’ for design practices that accumulates and improves 
over time. As mentioned in the previous section, PRMs are 
essentially control process design patterns that incorporate 
proven strategies in a re-usable form, saving time and 
improving quality and consistency. They map security 
compliance objectives to control processes and architectures 
that achieve them in defined business and technical contexts. 
The tool allows new PRMs to be created and stored in the 
Repository, and retrieved and instantiated as part of a new 
model when required.  
 
 
Figure 1 PRM Tool with SoD PRM 
 
During its initial creation the PRM elements and properties 
described in Section IV (name, description, problem context, 
parameters etc.) can be defined with the PRM tool. The 
solution of a PRM including its control objectives and the 
implementation artefacts, i.e. control processes and the 
corresponding infrastructure services, can be directly linked to 
elements modelled within the design workbench. Hence, if 
they are modified with their corresponding workbench tools 
(e.g. a process model editor) these modifications are 
immediately visible within the PRM. Moreover, this has the 
advantage that these elements can be also used in other PRMs. 
The PRM in Figure 1 describes a Separation of Duty (SoD) 
control pattern that ensures that two roles R1 and R2 
performing critical operations within a business process BP 
are played by two separate agents. The PRM is implemented 
by a corresponding control process that enforces that the 
control objective is met. The control process depends on the 
infrastructural service AUTHZ that acts as authorization 
manager, and PROC that holds the descriptions of the process 
instances of BP the control process is applied to. The services 
and the control process for this PRM are defined in the design 
model SoD_Fragments and can also be used by other PRMs. 
The business process and the roles the control process is 
applied to are use-case dependent. Hence, these elements are 
parameterized. To achieve that, parameters can be defined on 
a PRM with the PRM tool. In our scenario there are three 
parameters: BP, R1 and R2. Each parameter represents an 
abstract element to be replaced by a concrete element that 
provides domain-specific information during the instantiation 
of a PRM in order to make the implementation artefacts 
executable. For instance the parameter BP in Figure 1 refers to 
an abstract Process element in the design model 
SoD_Fragments. During instantiation of the SoD PRM the 
abstract Process element and the Role elements have to be 
replaced by a concrete implementation these elements.   
The PRM tool provides a wizard that guides the user 
through the instantiation of a PRM. As shown in Figure 2, the 





concrete values for the listed parameters. More precisely, this 
means that she can supply concrete design model elements 
from arbitrary design models from the workbench or 
repository, respectively. In order to do that for each parameter 
she provides the path to the design model that contains the 
element that has to serve as parameter value and selects the 
design model element from the combo box. Our SoD PRM has 
to be applied to a loan approval process. Hence, as shown in 
Figure 2 the BP parameter is instantiated with a Credit 
Process. The combo boxes list only elements of a design 
model that match the type of the parameter defined by the 
abstract element. Therefore, to instantiate the first role R1, 
only those elements of the selected design model that have the 
type Role are listed in the combo box. Figure 2 lists, in this 
case Auditor, Clerk and Manager.  
 
Figure 2 PRM Instantiation Wizard 
 
After the user has provided the values for each parameter 
she finishes the wizard and the PRM is instantiated by creating 
a new design model out of it that is stored in the workbench. 
In our example a design model is created that contains the 
Credit Process and the SoD control process that can be 
performed for the specified roles along with the infrastructure 
services. 
VI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The current prototype provides an excellent platform for 
continued experimental implementation of aspects of the 
Workbench vision that we did not have time to investigate or 
implement fully during the MASTER project. Re-use of 
parameterised models in design patterns is already present in 
the workbench in the form of the PRM tool. While this is 
effective in proving and demonstrating a viable approach there 
are many details to be fleshed out. Once a framework for re-
use has been established, PRM libraries need to be developed 
providing abstract solutions to compliance requirement 
commonly appearing in regulations and corporate policies.  
PRMs are only one form of knowledge management that 
would be useful in a Workbench. The design process makes 
extensive use of knowledge derived from experience. 
Traditionally, this has been held in the heads of experts, and in 
text books, codes of practice and standards. A future research 
project could incorporate an expert system into the 
Workbench to provide advice on design decisions. The 
knowledge base of the expert system could be seeded with 
generic guidance, and expanded over time with enterprise-
specific and sector-specific knowledge to become a living 
means of continuous improvement. An important aspect of the 
project would be investigation of means of capturing new 
knowledge and otherwise maintaining the knowledge base. 
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